In the standard life cycle model, young people will make optimal educational investment decisions if they are able to finance these investments by borrowing against future earnings. The presence of debt does not distort future decisions. In the early 2000s, a highly selective university phased in a "no loans" policy under which the loan component of financial aid awards was replaced with no-strings-attached grants. We use this natural experiment to identify the causal effect of student debt on employment outcomes. We find evidence that debt leads graduates to choose higher-salary jobs and reduces the probability that students choose low-paid "public interest" jobs. We also find some evidence that debt affects students' academic performance during college. Taken together, our estimates suggest that recent college graduates are not life-cycle agents. Two potential explanations are that young workers are credit constrained or that they are averse to holding debt. We find suggestive evidence that debt reduces students' donations to the institution in the years after they graduate and increases the likelihood that a graduate will default on a pledge made during her senior year, which we argue is more likely to be consistent with credit constraints than with debt aversion.
I.

Introduction
The returns to a college degree have risen substantially in recent years, but the cost of higher education has risen even more quickly. Between 1993 and 2005, the college wage premium rose by 27% (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2007) 1 , while real tuition and fees at public and private four-year colleges rose by 74% and 50%, respectively (Trends in College
Pricing 2005, Table A1 ). 2 Rising costs have made financial aid more important. The proportion of full-time, full-year undergraduates receiving financial aid rose from 58.7% in 1993 to 76.1% in 2004 (Snyder, Tan, and Hoffman 2006, Table 320 ).
Student loans are an increasingly important component of aid packages. The proportion of students on aid who take out at least some loans rose from 55 percent in 1993 to 65 percent in 2003; over the same period, the proportion receiving grant aid fell slightly, from 83 to 82 percent (Snyder et al. 2006 , Table 320 ). As a result, college graduates' debt burdens have risen. The average college graduate in 1993 had incurred $8,462 in student debt. In 2004, this had risen to $13,275. Among those with positive debt, the average rose from $12,565 in 1993 to $20,386 in 2004. 3 Some argue that the looming need to make loan payments leads students with debt to major in career-oriented fields or to choose more lucrative, or less risky, post-graduation jobs than would be otherwise optimal. 4 They also argue that educational debt deters individuals from 1 http://www.epi.org/datazone/06/wagebyed_a.pdf 2 All figures in this paper are inflated to 2005 dollars using the CPI-U. The figures for college costs are enrollment-weighted.
3 Student debt dwarfs another oft-cited source of indebtedness, credit card debt. The average senior in 2004 owed $512 in credit card debt (the median was $0; the average and median among those with positive credit card debt were $2,874 and $1,654, respectively). These figures and those in the text are computed from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Surveys of 1992 Surveys of -1993 Surveys of and 2003 Surveys of -2004 . 4 For example, Kamenetz (2006) cites a "nationwide survey" from 2002 which found that "... 20 percent of student loan borrowers significantly changed their career plans because of student loans...." (p. 53).
purchasing homes or getting married, or assuming other responsibilities typically associated with full-fledged "adulthood" (Chiteji, 2007) .
These claims are puzzling from a traditional economics perspective. In a standard lifecycle model, student debt has only an income effect-proportional to the ratio of debt to the present discounted value of total lifetime earnings-on career and other post-college decisions.
As debt represents just over 1% of lifetime earnings for a typical college graduate, we expect any such effects to be extremely small. One reason debt may nonetheless matter is that young people -particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds -may be "debt averse" (see, e.g., Burdman 2005 , Callender and Jackson 2004 , and Field 2005 . If holding debt reduces utility independent of any effects on consumption, recent graduates may attempt to repay loans quickly or otherwise act as if debt payments are more constraining than they really are.
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A second potential source of non-trivial debt effects on post-graduation decisions is a failure of capital markets. While much of the literature in education focuses on constraints in students' access to credit before and during college, constraints after college graduation can also affect decisions. Young workers' current annual incomes are typically much lower than their permanent incomes, and many may prefer to borrow to finance current consumption. If recent graduates are unable to do this, debt will have first-order effects on early-career consumption, and students' decisions may be motivated, in part, by efforts to minimize these effects.
There is suggestive evidence from non-educational contexts that many consumers are unable to borrow at reasonable interest rates. For example, Warner and Pleeter (2001) find that a majority of members of the Armed Forces selected the lump sum payment when offered the choice between an annuity and lump sum bonus as a separation payment. The interest rate that would justify this decision typically exceeded 20 percent. Gross and Souleles (2002) report that well over one-half of households with at least one credit card regularly roll over debt, with the median revolving account equal to about $7,000, even though the interest rates run about 15 percent. They also find that when credit limits are increased, there is an immediate and significant rise in credit card debt, especially for those who were already close to maxing out their cards. 6 Finally, Souleles (1999) and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) find that consumption increases substantially after families receive income tax refunds, where the standard model predicts that predictable income shocks should have no effect on consumption.
In educational settings, the evidence on imperfections in capital markets is mixed and inconclusive. Cameron and Taber (2004) study the impact of borrowing constraints on educational decisions by exploiting the fact that direct and opportunity costs of education have different effects on credit constrained individuals. They find little evidence that constraints limit otherwise-optimal educational investment. Heckman and Lochner (2000;  see also Carneiro and Heckman 2002 ) also argue that borrowing constraints during the college-going years are not important determinants of college attendance, and that family income affects attendance primarily through its effect on students' academic preparedness. In contrast, Ellwood and Kane (2000) argue that differences in college attendance by family income are partly explained by credit constraints.
In this paper we take advantage of a unique natural experiment to study the effect of educational debt on students' early career decisions. In the early 2000s, a highly selective university (hereafter referred to as Anonymous University, or "Anon U") phased in a "no loans"
policy, under which the loan component of financial aid awards was replaced with expanded no- 6 In addition, many families pay college tuition bills with credit cards, and roll over the resulting debt. This would not be rational unless these families lacked access to educational loans with lower rates. strings-attached grants. Using data on Anon U financial aid recipients before and after the implementation of this policy, we can compare the academic outcomes and career choices of otherwise-identical students who graduated from Anon U with very different amounts of student debt. We also have data on students who did not receive financial aid, which permits us to control for unobserved factors (such as the state of the macroeconomy) that might have led to different outcomes for students in the pre-and post-reform cohorts even in the absence of the policy change. Our empirical strategy combines control function and instrumental variables strategies to take advantage of within-and between-cohort variation in student debt. The debt effect is identified from changes across cohorts in the aid packages offered to otherwise identical students (in particular, students with the same financial need and family resources).
We find evidence, consistent across several specifications, that debt leads graduates to choose higher-salary jobs. Much or all of this effect is across occupations, as debt appears to reduce the probability that students choose low-paid "public interest" jobs. Debt effects are most notable on the propensity to take a job as a teacher. We also find suggestive (though imprecise) evidence that financial constraints affect students' academic performance during college.
To help us distinguish whether these effects are due to credit constraints or aversion to debt, we analyze data on alumni pledges and donations. One would expect debt aversion to be reasonably constant over the life cycle, and therefore college seniors should anticipate its effects on their future choices. By contrast, college students may not anticipate the degree to which credit constraints will bind in the period after graduation.
7 Although estimates are imprecise, debt seems to have a larger effect on recent graduates' actual gifts to Anon U than it does on the 7 One reason for a failure to anticipate this is that students have access to a variety of government and thirdparty loans on relatively good terms. Access to this sort of credit dries up after graduation, and recent graduates are likely to have to rely on forms of borrowing-e.g. credit cards-that offer substantially worse terms than those they faced during college.
pledges they make during their senior year. This appears to support the credit constraints hypothesis, though because we rely on speculation about the ability to anticipate each effect, this interpretation should be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive.
We next describe the policy in more detail in Section II. Section III describes a simple multi-period model of consumption that formalizes the interaction of debt with credit constraints in influencing career decisions. Section IV develops our full estimation strategy, which combines control function and instrumental variables methods. We describe in Section V the rich data, drawn from Anon U's administrative records, used for our analysis. Section VI presents results. Section VII discusses the generalizability of our results to wider student populations and Section VIII concludes.
II. The Anon U Policy Reform
Anon U is one of the most selective, expensive colleges in the country, and it enrolls only the most qualified students. Like other elite colleges, it prides itself on the diversity of its students, and it competes to enroll the relatively few high school graduates of modest means with top academic credentials (Hill and Winston 2006) .
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In 1998 and again in 2001, Anon U officials announced reforms of their financial aid program to reduce the role of student debt in aid packages. Total nominal aid awards-the sum of the face value of loans, grants, and campus work-were approximately unchanged, and grants were expanded to fill the gap left by loans. These reforms represented a substantial increase in the value of Anon U's aid packages, as the present value of a grant (which need not be repaid) is much higher than that of even a subsidized loan. Officials at Anon U claim the reforms were undertaken to eliminate financial concerns from the decision to apply to or attend the school and to increase the number of low-income students matriculating. The policy was not explicitly undertaken to influence the post-graduation plans of students.
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To fully understand the implications of this reform for students, it is useful to consider how Anon U determines a student's financial aid package. Students are admitted to Anon U without regard to their financial circumstances. 10 Along with their admissions applications and in every academic year thereafter, they may apply for financial aid. The aid application solicits detailed information about the income and assets of the student and her parents. The Anon U financial aid office uses this information to develop an assessment of the family's ability to pay, following a modified (and more generous) version of the formula used by federal aid programs.
The primary determinants of the "expected family contribution" are parental income and assets, though student savings and summertime earnings also enter the calculation.
Whenever the family contribution falls short of the total annual costs of attendancetuition, room, board, and an estimate of additional living expenses -the student is judged to need aid. Anon U puts together a personalized aid package that closes the gap. An aid offer has two "self help" components: a student loan and a campus job during the term. Each of these is capped -students are not expected to work more than about 10 hours per week during the term, nor to incur more than about $4,500 in debt per year of enrollment (or approximately $18,000 9 The policy also had substantial publicity value, as Anon U got a great deal of press attention for its efforts to be more affordable. Linsenmeier, Rosen and Rouse (2006) study the effect of the Anon U reforms on student "yield," and find a small demand response. Some of Anon U's peer institutions have since announced similar reforms, each to great fanfare.
10 At many universities, admission probabilities are higher for students who can afford to pay the full tuition. Anon U, like other highly endowed elite universities, promises "need blind" admissions. In fact, there is reason to suspect that Anon U and its competitors give small preferences to needy applicants, as a mechanism for maintaining economic diversity. Bowen, Kurzweil, and Tobin (2005, pp. 101-108) , however, find that any such preferences are quite small. over four years).
11 Any remaining demonstrated need after reaching the self help limits is met through unconditional grants.
12
Students may take up their offered aid package in whole or in part. Not surprisingly, take-up on the grant component -free money -is high. But students commonly substitute among the self-help components, working more during the term and taking on less debt or vice versa. Even the total quantity of self help is elastic: Some students take on additional debt in order to relieve the burden on their parents, while others manage to reduce their need by saving more than is expected from summer earnings, consuming less during the year than the aid office budgets, or drawing on more assistance from their parents than was indicated by the aid formula.
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Under the new Anon U policy, the loan cap was lowered to zero. As neither the formulae for computing parental contributions and demonstrated need nor the cap on expected term-time earnings changed, this entailed more generous grants for nearly all students on aid. Students were not required to take the full value of this policy through loan reductions; some continued to take out loans in order to reduce term-time work or parent contributions or to permit more consumption during college.
11 The interest rate on loans is subsidized. The present value of the subsidy amounts to around $0.50 per dollar of loans (Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse, 2006) . Similarly, most campus jobs -particularly those under the federal "work study" program, which subsidizes the wage bill for the lowest-income of Anon U's students -pay above-market wages. 12 The formula thus indicates that students whose demonstrated need is less than the sum of the self-help caps are not allocated any grants. There are several exceptions to this, however. First, students who are eligible for federal Pell Grants or who win external scholarships can use these to displace self help. Second, conversations with the Anon U financial aid staff indicate that most students with positive demonstrated need are given at least a token institutional grant. Anon U is unusual in this regard -less wealthy universities will typically give grants only to students with larger need, and are not always able to provide enough aid to meet the full demonstrated need. 13 Parents may themselves take on debt, through federal "PLUS" loans or unsubsidized loans from Anon U or third-party lenders, but the terms on these are usually worse than those on student debt.
The "no-loans" policy was implemented in two stages. First, beginning in 1998, loans were eliminated for new matriculants (from the class of 2002 and beyond) whose parents had low incomes, defined as family income below about $40,000 in nominal dollars. Approximately 18% of aid recipients from the class of 2002 qualified for this in their freshman year. Students from moderate income families (between $40,000 and $57,500) got partial loan reduction.
Higher-income students (approximately 61% of aid recipients) continued to receive loans, as did all students from pre-2002 classes, who remained under the old regime.
In a second phase, the no-loans policy was extended in 2001 to cover all students on aid.
This phase applied to all students on campus at the time, regardless of cohort. Thus, a non-lowincome student from the class of 2002 was required to take out loans for her first three years on campus but was covered by the no-loans policy during her senior year. One can see that low-income students were required to take out fewer loans than higher-income students even before the no-loans policy was introduced. Those in the classes of 2002 and beyond, however, were covered by the first phase of the no-loans policy and were assigned zero loans. Middle-income students were partially covered by the first phase and fully covered by the 14 Work awards actually fell slightly over the period. This decline, along with the continued presence of loans even after the no-loan policy was fully implemented, suggests that beneficiaries of this policy consumed some of their reduced self-help requirements by cutting back on campus work.
III. A Simple Model of Debt and Occupational Choice
We suggested above that student debt should have very small effects on post-college choices of unconstrained students, but that if individuals are debt averse, or face credit constraints or other limits to the ability to borrow against future earnings, debt could have firstorder effects on graduates' job choices. This result derives from a two-period life-cycle model in which per-period utility depends on both consumption and job amenities. Amenities might encompass the total hours required, the flexibility of the work schedule, the pleasantness of the work, or any other aspects of a job that make it appealing. Importantly for our empirical analysis, some people may consider "public interest" work to constitute a job amenity. Because amenities have no natural scale, we scale them in dollars of salary forgone on the upper envelope of the choice set -a job offering zero amenities will offer salary ψ, one offering amenity level a will offer salary ψ -a.
Graduates work for two periods. Per-period utility equals u t (c t , a t ), where t indexes periods and u t has positive first partial derivatives and negative second partial derivatives. The unconstrained individual maximizes lifetime utility
subject to the lifetime budget constraint,
where δ is the discount rate, r is the interest rate, d is the value of student debt (in period-1 dollars), ψ 1 and ψ 2 are potential earnings in periods 1 and 2, respectively, and y 1 and y 2 are actual earnings.
With this setup, debt merely reduces lifetime income, and has solely income effects.
These are of order d/Y, where Y= ψ 1 + (1+r) -1 ψ 2 is the present value of lifetime potential earnings. While, in theory, income effects could alter college and post-graduation decisions; in practice, educational debt comprises only alittle more than 1% of the lifetime earnings of a college graduate which would be unlikely to make much of a difference.
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Different results obtain if the agent faces a constraint that limits her borrowing. The debt position at the end of period 1 is Credit constraints are not the only possible source of debt effects on intertemporal optimization. Debt aversion-a term in lifetime utility that depends on the amount of debt held at period 1, independent of the level of consumption or amenities in each period-can generate a similar wedge between period-1 and period-2 marginal utility, with similarly distorting effects on career choices. Below, we provide indirect evidence that helps to distinguish credit constraint and debt aversion explanations for debt effects.
IV. Estimation Strategy
Our goal is to identify the effect of student debt on various outcomes, both during college and after graduation. As such we are interested in whether debt affects students' decisions at a certain point in their lives, relative to reaching the same point without debt. The Anon U reform, then, provides just the right counterfactual: Students with financial need in later cohorts were given enough grant aid to meet that need without recourse to student loans. A comparison with otherwise-identical students from earlier cohorts can identify the loan effect of interest, provided that pure time effects are adequately addressed.
The most straightforward way to implement this comparison is as a difference-indifferences (DID) analysis, comparing the between-cohort change in mean outcomes among financial aid recipients with the change among students not receiving aid. Recipients were "treated" by the no-loans policy if they were in later cohorts but not if they were in earlier cohorts. Students who did not need financial aid should not have been affected by the policy regardless of their cohort, and can therefore be used to control for business cycle and other time effects.
The DID strategy has two important shortcomings. First, there may have been changes in the relative characteristics of aid recipients over time, not least because the rising cost of attending Anon U shifted families who would not previously have needed aid into the aidrecipient category. Failure to control for this will result in a biased estimate of the aid effect.
Second, the DID estimator does not exploit variation in the intensity of treatment, either across or within cohorts. Students with very little financial need would have taken few loans in any case, so were not much affected by the no-loans policy, while those with greater need got larger benefits.
In the rest of this section, we develop an alternative strategy for estimating the loan effect. Our ultimate estimator combines instrumental variables-to exploit policy-induced variation in debt rather than that coming from heterogeneity in student negotiating skills or preferences-with a "control function" specification that uses data on family financial circumstances to absorb potentially confounding variation in family background.
We begin with a naive model for the effect of debt:
(1)
where y ic represents the outcome for student i in cohort c, a is an intercept, d ic is the level of educational debt with which student i graduates, and e ic is a normally distributed error term. The coefficient b represents the effect of debt on the outcome in question.
The most important form of bias is omitted variables. Equation (1) includes no controls for differences between students or their families. Most of the variation in student debt-and all of the variation in offered debt within a single cohort-derives from differences in families' financial resources. Family background is likely to have strong effects on academic and employment outcomes. We can decompose the error term in (1) into a component that depends on family background and an orthogonal component, e ic = f(B ic ) + u ic , where B ic is a hypothetical complete measure of the student's background. Substituting, our model becomes
If high B values correspond to greater family wealth and higher wealth leads to better outcomes, f(B) will be negatively correlated with d, inducing a downward bias in estimates of b from
equation (1).
A natural solution is to include controls for family characteristics. However, in practice we can plausibly observe only a subset, X ic , of the variables that should be included in B ic . Bias will be eliminated if that subset absorbs the portion of f(B) that is correlated with student loans,
To see this, consider the reduced-form model:
An estimate of b from (3) will be unbiased so long as f(B ic ) -X ic c, the portion of the effect of the B ic variables that remains after projecting f(B ic ) onto the X ic vector, is uncorrelated with d ic ; that
It is not necessary to fully control for f(B ic ), but only to absorb that part of it that is correlated with d ic .
In principle, we have enough information to construct X variables that accomplish this, so long as loan take-up is exogenous. One of the variables included in our data is the "family contribution," the amount that the aid office anticipates the student's family will be able to contribute toward the costs of attendance. The student's need is the difference between the total costs of attendance and the family contribution, and the offered loan is a function of this. Thus, we can rewrite the reduced-form model, equation (3), in terms of the expected family contribution (FC ic ) to the student's educational expenses as a measure of X ic : is itself unrelated with f(B ic ).
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This final assumption is implausible. Empirically, there is a fair amount of variation in actual loans that is unexplained by the loan offer. This variation may reflect differences in tastes or in expectations about future earnings. In particular, those who expect high future earnings (i.e., have a high u ic when y ic is earnings) should consume more in college, and may take out more debt to finance this. This will bias an OLS estimate of b from equation (4) upward. This form of bias is relatively easy to avoid, however, as we can simply instrument for the amount of debt actually taken, d ic , with the amount dictated by the aid formula, d ic * .
18 17 This strategy can be seen as a propensity score estimator, albeit with a continuous treatment variable, as flexible controls for X i absorb the endogeneity in d i . 18 In practice, there is some evidence that the financial aid office occasionally deviates from its formula in response to student requests, particularly when Anon U is in competition with other colleges for a particular student. For our purposes, the "offered loan" is that indicated by the formula, even if in practice a different offer is made.
Within a single cohort, sufficiently flexible controls for the family contribution will absorb all of the variation in the offered loan. This is where the Anon U reform comes in: The debt offer depends differently on the family contribution for different cohorts, and with data on cohorts spanning the reform this variation is not absorbed in a projection of offered debt, d ic * , on the family contribution, FC ic . That is, because the g c () function varies across cohorts, even
Our preferred specification combines the control function and instrumental variables strategies. Our estimating equations are:
Here, a c and α c are full sets of cohort indicators to absorb pure cohort effects on outcomes and debt; h(FC ic ) is a polynomial in the family contribution, and η(FC ic ) carries this polynomial into the first-stage equation. We also present estimates that use just the control function or just the instrumental variables strategy.
Our identifying assumption is that variation in d ic * across students in different cohorts with the same FC ic is uncorrelated with differences in ε ic = f(B ic ) -h(FC ic ) + u ic , the error term in (5). We construct d ic * by applying the Anon U aid formula for the student's cohort to the observed family contribution variable. By the argument above, this is uncorrelated with f(B ic ) -h(FC ic ), the residual component of family background, so long as h() is sufficiently flexible. We model h() as a cubic. To further guard against the possibility that this fails to fully capture the variation used in the loan assignment, we control for the total financial need and, in some specifications, for the loan that would have been offered had the student been in the 1999 or the 2002 cohort. With these controls, the debt effect is identified solely from across-cohort variation among students who would have been offered the same aid package had they been in the same cohort.
Even so, our identifying assumption would be violated if there were differential underlying trends in the employment outcomes of students receiving and not receiving financial aid. One possible source of such differential trends might be changes in the composition of the Anon U aid population. In some specifications, we include controls for several non-aid student characteristics: Indicators for whether the student was a legacy (i.e. had parents who attended Anon U), the first in the family to attend college, or a recruited athlete; a cubic in family income;
and a full set of indicators for the academic and personal ratings given to the student's admissions application. These additional controls have essentially no effect on our estimates.
A final issue is the possibility of sample selection. The Anon U policy was well publicized, and some of the cohorts used in our analyses entered Anon U after the policy was announced. If students made college choices on the basis of the policy, this could induce selection bias in our analyses. Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2006) find evidence that the policy increased Anon U's yield from admitted students -the fraction who chose to matriculate -in the first cohorts that matriculated after the announcement of the first policy change. This effect is quite small, amounting to approximately 30 students per cohort. Sample selection of this sort is unlikely to bias our results. As a validity test, however, below we present analyses that exclude students who entered Anon U after the full no-loans policy was announced. The loan effect is then identified from students from the 2002-2004 cohorts, who (if they were not from low-income families) were partially treated by the "no loans" policy.
V. Data
Our data come from Anon U's administrative records, and describe students from the cohorts that entered between Fall 1995 and Fall 2002 and, for the most part, graduated between 1999 and 2006.
A. Financial Aid Data
Our key explanatory variables come from financial aid records. We observe the estimated family contribution and the size and composition of the aid award. We convert all dollar figures to 2005 dollars. The aid data are in student-year format, while most of our analysis focuses on student-level records. We sum the student loans taken over all years that the student appears in the aid data, and average the family contribution over the student's (first) four years of enrollment.
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The financial aid formula specifies the loan that should have been offered to each student as a function of the difference between the cost of attendance and the family contribution. This formula does not always seem to be followed in the data, in part because some students negotiate changes to their initial awards and only the final amount is reported. We use the formula to simulate the loan that should have been offered to each student, given her family's income and the computed family contribution.
Not all students apply for aid in every year. This complicates our analysis, as our key control variables are available only for aid applicants. We assume that any student who did not apply for aid would not have been found to have need in any case. This implies that her 19 91 percent of Anon U matriculants graduate within four years and 96 percent graduate within five years. We have found no evidence that the no-loans program influenced this. expected family contribution is at least as high as the cost of attendance, and we impute this value.
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Other details of our data construction are discussed in a Data Appendix, available from the authors. In general, our decisions were made with an eye toward maximizing the comparability of the data across cohorts. This leads us to censor variables from some cohorts to match the censoring that may have occurred in other cohorts. For example, a family in the 1999 cohort whose contribution exceeded the cost of attendance might not have applied for aid.
Because costs rose over time, a family with the same income in the 2005 cohort might have received aid. We censor this family's contribution at the 1999 cohort's cost of attendance, to preserve the symmetry with our treatment of a non-applying corresponding family from that cohort. Our loan simulation is based on this censored contribution, although results are robust to alternative censoring rules-e.g., using the actual costs as the censoring point-and to the use of uncensored data. Table 1 presents "first stage" estimates that relate the composition of the actual aid package, cumulated over all years of enrollment, with the simulated cumulative loan offer. Each specification includes controls for cohort (a full set of dummy variables), a cubic in the parental contribution, indicators for the number of years that the contribution is censored and the number of years that the student applied for aid, and the student's cumulative financial need. With such rich controls for family circumstances, the simulated loan effect is identified exclusively from 20 Some students who apply for aid have expected family contributions that are above the cost of attendance. We censor these at the lower level, and include dummy variables in our regressions for the number of years that the contribution was imputed or censored. Another complication arises because estimated costs vary with, for example, the distance between the student's home and Anon U. We use the modal cost in each year for all students.
the differential effects of across-cohort variation in the loan formula on students with different need levels.
Column 1 presents an analysis in which the actual debt incurred is the dependent variable. The simulated loan is highly predictive of the realized loan, which rises by about $0.77 for each additional dollar of the (simulated) loans offer. This effect is quite precisely measured.
Columns 2 and 3 take as dependent variables the other components of the aid award, beginning with the grant component of aid. If our simulation perfectly reproduced the aid office's calculations, the simulated loan would reduce the grant award one-for-one. The estimated coefficient (Column 2) is -0.90. The shortfall indicates that we have failed to reproduce every aspect of the aid process, but the divergence is small. 21 Column 3 presents an analysis of termtime student work. For each dollar of loan reduction, students reduced their campus work by 8 cents. 22 Column 4 indicates that the simulated loan is weakly (but significantly) negatively associated with total aid, the sum of grants, work, and loans. As we control for need, and as Anon U always offers an aid package that meets total need, the negative point estimate indicates that take-up of aid packages is lower when these packages include more debt, perhaps because some students substitute additional parental contributions for offered loans.
B. Other Data
We use other administrative data sets to create a variety of control variables and outcome measures. We draw from admissions data the student's SAT score and legacy status, the type of 21 The most likely culprit is that we do not capture adjustments made to the formula award on a case-bycase basis by financial aid staff. 22 We do not observe the actual hours worked, but only those that were part of the final financial aid offer. Upon receipt of the original offer, which might have specified $0 in loans and $1500 in term-time earnings, students were permitted to negotiate alternative divisions of the "self help" component between loans and work. Our point estimate indicates that the average student receiving a $0/$1500 initial award negotiated a final award that specified $120 in debt and $1380 in work.
high school attended (public or private), and the numerical ratings given to the application. The registrar provided information about the major, minors, grade point average (GPA), and honors received. 23 Our richest outcome measures come from an "exit survey" conducted by the Office of Career Services during the week before graduation. The survey asks about plans during the next year, and students who have already obtained jobs are asked their occupation, industry, and annual salary. Response rates are typically above 97%. Finally, the Development Office provided information on students' donations to the university's "annual giving" campaigns in the first several years after graduation. Anon U's solicitations start early, and students are asked during their senior year to make pledges covering each of the next five years. We observe both pledges and actual gifts, though our ability to look several years beyond graduation is limited for the most recent classes.
Because Anon U uses the same ID number in all of its administrative data sets, we were quite successful at merging data from the various sources. 24 9,287 students from the [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] classes appear in the registrar's data. We have complete data on admissions qualifications, employment outcomes, and alumni pledges for 8,717 of them.
25 Table 2 presents comparisons of the observable characteristics of students from the 1999-2001 cohorts (nearly all of whom graduated before the no loans program) and those from the
2005-2006 cohorts (who entered after full implementation). We distinguish between students
with positive financial need, who would have been affected by the no-loans policy, and students 23 There are no double-majors at Anon U, and minors are permitted only in a limited number of fields that are (typically) not available as majors. The available minors include finance, public policy, various foreign languages and area studies, and elementary/secondary education. 24 For confidentiality reasons, we were given data containing only an anonymized version of this ID number. The anonymization algorithm was the same in each database, however, permitting us to merge them. without need, who would not. Columns (1) and (2) show the average characteristics of "no need" and "need" students in the earlier cohorts, while columns (3) and (4) show the analogous groups from the later cohorts. Columns (5) and (6) show the change over time for each group, and column (7) shows the difference between these.
Students with need have lower average SAT scores than those without need, are less likely to be white, and are much less likely to have attended private high schools (although even so, a third of students with need attended such schools). There were few changes between the two cohorts in racial composition or the type of school attended. Elite college admissions became much more competitive over this period, however, and SAT scores rose dramatically in both the "need" and "no-need" subgroups.
The remaining rows of the table show financial characteristics, which are generally available only for students who apply for financial aid and are therefore shown only for students with need. Real family incomes of students with need rose about 8 percent between cohorts, and mean family contributions rose by a bit less than $900. Average need rose dramatically, by over $12,000. This primarily reflects the increasing cost of attending Anon U-tuition, fees, and room and board collectively rose by $12,122 over this period. 26 Despite the increase in average need, student loans fell dramatically, from $15,485 in the 1999-2001 cohorts to less than $3,500
in the 2005-6 cohorts. Some students without demonstrated need took student loans as well, but the average amounts are quite small. 27 26 The increase in costs may explain the increase in the family incomes of students with need (which amounts to about $6,000 at the mean), as families whose expected contributions fell between the old and new tuition levels would have been judged to have need in the later period but not in the earlier period. 27 We have been told that some students who apply for aid but are found not to have need are nevertheless offered token aid packages. The decline in loans among no-need students may indicate that loans were removed from these packages when the no-loans policy was implemented.
Our model suggests that in the presence of debt aversion or credit constraints debt will lead students to substitute toward higher-salary jobs with lower levels of job amenities, particularly in the years immediately after graduation when constraints are likely to be most binding. We provide descriptive results in Table 3 , which presents our primary outcome measures, grouped into "academic," "career," and "alumni gifts" categories. Aid recipients have lower GPAs and rates of honors receipt than non-aid recipients. GPAs rose for both groups of students in the later cohorts, with a slightly larger increase for aid recipients. There were no meaningful changes in honors receipt.
Turning to the career outcomes, we find little relative change in aid recipients' propensities to plan employment or graduate school during the year after graduation, nor in the probability that they will have a job lined up as of graduation. There do appear to be shifts in the types of jobs that they take, however, as measured by the industry. We consider two groups of high-salary and two groups of low-salary industries. Our first group of high-salary industries includes consulting 28 , banking, and finance jobs, which collectively account for over half of Anon U students with jobs on graduation. Our second group adds to these a group of industries-like pharmaceuticals and computer products and services-that also offer high mean salaries. On the low-salary side, we first consider the nonprofit, government, and education sectors (together 19% of our sample), then expand this to include other low-salary industries like publishing and architecture.
Aid recipients shifted out of industries with high average salaries and into lower-salary industries. While there was no relative decline in the share taking jobs in the consulting, investment banking, and finance sectors-the most prominent high-salary employers of Anon U graduates-there was a notable increase in the share taking jobs in the nonprofit, government, and education sectors. Consistent with this shift, we see that aid recipients missed out on the increase in salaries seen among non-recipients.
The last rows of the table show mean alumni pledges and gifts for the year immediately following graduation, when alumni are perhaps most likely to be financially constrained. We see significant increases in both pledges and gifts from aid recipients. The change for non-aidrecipients-who both pledge and give more than recipients in all cohorts-is smaller and not significant.
All of these changes are consistent with an effect of debt on students' career choices and on the constraints that they face after graduation. These descriptive changes may be confounded, however, by changes in the characteristics of students who receive aid. In the next section, we present analyses that use the IV and control function strategies outlined above to obtain consistent individual-level estimates of the effect of debt on student outcomes. Table 4 presents estimates of the effect of student loans on various employment outcomes. We test for debt effects on whether the student has a job lined up as of graduation and whether she plans to work the next year or go to graduate school. Among those with jobs, we look for evidence that debt affects the choice of industry or occupation. Finally, we study the effect of debt on the student's self-reported starting salary.
VI. Results
A. Effects on Employment Outcomes
Columns (1) - (3) present OLS results, without any controls (column 1), with a cubic in the expected family contribution and a linear control for the total need (column 2), and with those controls plus a vector of other family background and academic quality controls (indicators for being a first-generation college student, a legacy at Anon U, or a recruited athlete, plus academic and non-academic admissions ratings and the simulated loan under the rules that applied to the 1999 and 2002 cohorts) in column 3. 29 The next three columns repeat these specifications but instrument for the observed loan with our simulated loan offer. The first stage coefficients in the three specifications are shown in the first row. As in Table 1 , the coefficients suggest that the instrument is strongly related to the actual loan amount and that a dollar in simulated loans increases a student's actual loans by about 77 cents.
In the simplest specifications without controls, we estimate a negative and statistically significant effect of loans on the likelihood that an individual has a job upon graduation (Row 1).
When we add controls for family financial circumstances, however, the coefficient estimate become less negative, suggesting that the original negative coefficient reflected differences between students with and without financial need rather than any causal effect. The estimates become positive but statistically insignificant when we instrument for offered loans (columns 5 and 6). We find similarly insignificant effects of debt on students' propensity to plan employment (whether or not they have jobs lined up already) or on plans to attend graduate school during the year after Anon U graduation, although the point estimates indicate positive effects on employment and negative effects on graduate school.
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The next rows examine the distribution of accepted jobs across industries. We see little impact of loans on the probability that a student takes a job in the high-salary groups of 29 Column 2 also includes controls for the number of years that the family contribution was censored or imputed. We present only linear probability models. Results are similar (though more difficult to interpret in IV specifications) when we use probit models instead. 30 The predicted effect on graduate school is ambiguous, as loan payments can be deferred while a student is in school. Still, if students are at all averse to taking on heavy debt, undergraduate debt may deter them from incurring further debt for graduate school.
industries. By contrast, we find negative, statistically significant effects on employment in the low-salary occupations. Specifically, in our preferred specifications in columns (5) and (6), we estimate that an extra $10,000 in loans decreases the likelihood that an individual will take a job in education, government, or nonprofits by about 5-6 percentage points. This is a large effect, particularly when compared with the approximately 17% baseline share of students going into these sectors. Further investigation (not reported in Table 4 ) indicates that it is driven primarily by the education sector: In the specification from Column 6, $10,000 in student debt reduces the probability of taking a job in education by 3.3 percentage points (s.e. 0.20).
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We next look at the impact of college loans on a student's actual starting salary.
32 Our preferred specifications indicate that for each additional $10,000 in loans students accept jobs that pay about $2,000 (p-value 0.06 -0.10) more in annual salary. We also examine an indicator for relatively low salaries, defined as those below $41,000 in 2005 dollars (the 25 th percentile of our sample). We find that $10,000 in college loans decreases the likelihood that a student's salary is below this threshold by about 5 percentage points (p-value 0.09).
Overall, it appears that college debt affects post-graduation employment decisions: students with more debt are less likely to accept jobs in low-paying industries and accept higherpaying jobs more generally. Both results are consistent with the presence of credit constraints.
These effects on industry and starting salary are large. The current Stafford loan interest rate is 6.8% suggesting that a $10,000 loan paid off over ten years (the typical repayment period) would 31 There are also interesting substitution patterns among high-salary jobs. Debt appears to reduce the probability of taking a job in banking and to raise the probability of taking a job in consulting, though neither effect is statistically significant. 32 We have examined the sum of the starting salary and the anticipated annual bonus, with qualitatively similar results. Only 42% of students with jobs report an expected bonus, however, and the survey form does not distinguish missing values from zeros. We have also explored imputing salaries for the 21% of students who have jobs but do not report their salaries, using observed salary responses from other students working for the same firms. Estimates using the imputed data are similar to those reported in Table 4 , with similar standard errors once the variation introduced by the imputation is accounted for.
have annual payments of $1,380. Our result thus implies that after-debt-payment income rises with debt, though with a 33% tax rate our point estimates imply that after-tax earnings rise onefor-one with debt payments.
B.
Robustness Table 5 presents several alternative specifications meant to gauge the robustness of our industry and salary results to the details of the construction of our instrument and sample.
Column 1 repeats the estimates from Column 5 of Table 4 for several key outcomes. Column 2 adds to the endogenous debt measure the sum of any loans that students' parents have taken from
Anon U, either via the PLUS program or from Anon U's unsubsidized parental loans office.
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This has little effect on the estimates.
Column 3 returns to the original specification of the endogenous variable, but forms the instrument from an alternative simulation that uses the aid formula that applied to the years that the student was actually in attendance rather than those that applied to the first four years after the student enrolled. This simulation is identical for the 96% of graduates who finished in exactly four years until graduation (as well as for 0.3% who enrolled for three consecutive years and then graduated early), and differs only for students who took time off before graduating or who spent more than four years at Anon U. Not surprisingly, the alternative instrument yields nearly identical results. application or matriculation decisions of eligible students. Estimated debt effects are less precise in this column, though point estimates are generally similar to those in our main specifications.
We have also explored specifications that allow debt effects to vary with students' predetermined characteristics. Debt seems to have the largest effect on the salaries and employment choices of high-SAT students with low financial need, though these estimates are imprecise.
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C.
Effects on Educational Outcomes at Anon U The estimates presented above indicate that student debt reduces students' probabilities of taking low-salary jobs. If students anticipate these effects while in school, they may make different choices while at Anon U. Moreover, students who are more financially constrained may study more (if alternative activities are expensive) or less (if term-time employment tightens the time constraint) than those with more disposable funds. Thus, we also examine the effects of debt on students' academic performance.
Results are presented in Table 6 . Specifications are parallel to those in Table 4 . The first rows show effects on the student major, as measured by the broad academic division (i.e., social sciences, humanities, physical sciences, or engineering). OLS control function estimates seem to show that debt is associated with higher probabilities of majoring in the social sciences and humanities, at the expense of engineering. IV estimates without controls show the opposite effects. When we combine the two strategies in columns 5 and 6, both effects disappear. The next rows show effects on specific majors. Debt seems to have a positive effect on the probability of choosing an economics or engineering major, both associated with access to high-34 There does not seem to be any substantial variation of debt effects with gender. Unfortunately, there are too few black and Hispanic students at Anon U to permit meaningful analysis of this subgroup. salary jobs, and a negative effect on choosing a major from within a group that might be categorized as non-remunerative, 35 but both effects are imprecise. We find no indication of debt effects on academic minors, including the public policy and teaching certificates that seem most closely associated with the employment outcomes seen earlier.
The final rows of the table show models for students' GPAs and for whether they graduate with honors. In our basic IV control function specification (column 5), debt seems to have large negative effects on each. However, when we control for students' entering academic credentials-particularly relevant to academic outcomes at Anon U-in column 6, these effects shrink substantially and become indistinguishable from zero.
On the whole, debt appears to have small effects on the choice of major-inducing a shift toward majors that might be seen as oriented toward employment and away from "consumption"-type majors-and zero or small negative effects on academic performance. It seems reasonable to interpret the earlier estimates of debt effects on employment outcomes as reflecting students' choices rather than constraints imposed by their academic performance.
D. Effects on Alumni Giving
As a final outcome, we consider the effect of student loans on annual alumni giving to Anon U. This informs our analysis in two ways. First, if students perceive financial aid as a "gift" from the University, an increased pledge or gift may be a form of "exchange." Second, if debt causes students to be constrained after college, it will also increase the shadow cost of contributions and therefore reduce their level (at least during the constrained years). 36 Students approaching graduation seem likely to be able to anticipate their desire to give to the university, but may not anticipate the constraints that they will face in the "real world." We compare actual gifts with those pledged during the senior year, when the Anon U Development Office asks students to commit to their annual gifts for the next five years. Differences between what students pledge and what they actually give can be seen as evidence of unanticipated financial difficulty (or bounty), and may therefore help to distinguish credit constraints from other explanations for debt effects.
We present estimated effects in Table 7 for five measures of alumni gifts. Each specification uses the IV-control function specification from Column 5 of Tables 4 and 6 . In
Column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the student pledged a donation. In Column 2, it is an indicator for actually donating. Columns 3 and 4 examine the amount of the pledge or donation, assigning zero for students who do not participate. Finally, Column 5 examines an indicator for whether or not the gift fell short of the pledge (which occurs about one quarter of the time in the first year after graduation). The rows of the table examine gifts in different years: The first row presents results for gifts during the first year after graduation (mean = $21; 62% of students give gifts) and for pledges concerning gifts during that year; the second for gifts during the second year (mean = $27, 64% participation); etc. Note that the sample sizes are notably smaller in the bottom rows, as we have data only through the summer of 36 Anon U has a large endowment, so the primary cost to it of a deferred contribution is foregone investment earnings. Like other elite universities, Anon U typically earns higher returns than most individual investors. Still, even if a potential donor fully internalizes the effect on Anon U of deferring a contribution, the implied interest rate is most likely lower than that available to her from other lenders. The results suggest that college debt has no effect on whether students pledge donations (column 1). Debt does appear to have negative effects on whether students actually give (on the order of 3 percentage points per $10,000 in loans), though these are only marginally statistically significant (p-value 0.07 for year 1, 0.13 for year 2). We see similar patterns for amounts:
Effects on pledges are small (except in year 4, for which the sample includes only the classes through 2002), while there are somewhat larger effects on actual gifts. Finally, Column 5
indicates that debt has significant positive effects on the probability of defaulting on a pledge, at least in the first year after graduation.
The fact that we estimate much smaller impacts of college debt on the intentions of students at the time of graduation than we do on their actions one and two years later is indirect evidence of the presence of credit constraints. The effects are small in absolute magnitude but are reasonably large relative to the average gift from a recent graduate.
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VII. Generalizability of Findings
An important question concerns the generalizability of our results. Our analysis derives from a sample of students at a particular school, and our results might not extend to typical college students. We would argue, however, that there is at least good reason to suspect that debt 37 The class of 2005 is the first fully-treated class. Thus, estimates for year 2 and beyond are identified only from partially-treated students.
38 Anon U's officials may be interested in whether the no-loans program will pay for itself through increased donations. This depends strongly on the growth rate of debt effects as graduates age. Median nominal contributions from the class of 1985 over the first 20 years were 23.5 times the four-year median for that class. If debt effects grow at the same rate, the total effect of $10,000 in debt reduction will be to increase donations by $318, only a fraction of the cost of replacing $10,000 in loans with grants. Of course, donations are highly skewed, and a single large donation could overturn this calculation, as could increases in mean donations in the years beyond 20. effects should be larger for typical students than for Anon U graduates. Table 8 Anon U is one of the most selective schools in the country, and in an academic sense its students are clearly unrepresentative. They have much higher SAT scores and are more likely to have attended private high schools than their counterparts in any of the comparison samples. Aid recipients at Anon U are wealthier than students on aid nationwide, but generally are reasonably comparable with graduates from private colleges. For example, the mean family income among students receiving need-based financial aid at Anon U was approximately $93,000 (in 2005 dollars), where private college graduates had average family incomes of $84,000 and all graduates had average incomes of $74,000. Approximately 30% of Anon U aid recipients and 36% of those at comparable private schools have family incomes below $60,000 (which 39 The comparison samples are drawn from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS), a survey of college students. We restrict our attention to dependent students aged 18-24 who were enrolled full-time in 1999-2000 and graduated in that year. Because the NPSAS is a point-in-time survey rather than a panel, we select in both the NPSAS and the Anon U data on receiving aid during the senior year. Characteristics of Anon U students from later cohorts are similar in all dimensions except average student loans.
40 Anon U is a Carnegie Research I school.
corresponds roughly to the upper threshold for the "middle income" category in Figure 1 ). The students at Anon U thus come from somewhat wealthier families than do those at less selective institutions, though the differences are not large. Table 8 offers several reasons to expect that debt effects will be at least as large for typical students as for the unrepresentative students in our sample. First, debt levels at Anon U are relatively low, and Anon U students are for that reason less likely to reach any given debt constraint than are students from other schools. Second, Anon U students earn higher salaries Anon U students (Table 3) . Even if access to credit is independent of earnings, high salaries might reduce the utility cost of constrained consumption and thereby reduce the effect of debt on job choices. 41 Third, Anon U students' parents have relatively high earnings, and may be able to offer intra-family loans that permit consumption smoothing without employment distortions.
Finally, Anon U's students' higher SAT scores may indicate that they make better decisions, which again might reduce the effect of debt on choices.
VIII. Conclusion
41 Desired borrowing depends on the ratio of permanent income to present income. This ratio is plausibly higher for Anon U students than for others.
There is widespread concern about the level of debt incurred by those acquiring a postsecondary education. Among the concerns is that the debt burden distorts graduates' postschooling decisions. However, the basis for such concerns is unclear. In standard economic models, with well-functioning credit markets, student debt should have only income effects on career and consumption decisions of life-cycle optimizers; since debt comprises such a small portion of an average college graduate's lifetime earnings, these effects should be quite small.
Thus, in the typical economist's view, debt is the ideal mechanism for financing college education, as it permits a student to internalize the full costs of her investment decisions. It is not at all clear that high levels of student debt represent a market failure that warrants intervention.
In the standard model, Anon U's no-loan program should have had essentially no effect on its beneficiaries' career choices. This is not borne out by the data. When students were relieved from the need to incur debt, they shifted toward lower-salary jobs in public service industries. The point estimates indicate that changes in employment choices were large enough to entirely off-set the effect of student debt on after-tax, after-loan-payment earnings in the first years after graduation.
The most plausible explanations for this result are that recent college graduates are averse to holding debt or face constraints on their ability to borrow against future earnings, either of which could lead to non-trivial effects of student debt on occupational choices. Unfortunately, we have limited ability to distinguish these competing explanations. We find suggestive evidence that debt reduces students' donations to Anon U in the years after they graduate and increases the likelihood that a graduate will default on a pledge made during her senior year, indicating that seniors do not fully anticipate the effects of debt. We believe this finding is more consistent with credit constraints than debt aversion, as it seems likely that seniors will be able to anticipate their future debt aversion and less likely that they will correctly forecast constraints on their ability to borrow. This conclusion is necessarily tentative, however.
Our paper adds to an existing body of evidence that consumer behavior is poorly characterized by the lifecycle model. That said, there are many outstanding questions about the role of debt in decision-making that our paper does not address. For example, we have no direct evidence that student loans crowd out other forms of borrowing. If loans reduce graduates' ability to obtain home mortgages-which are typically taken out several years after college graduation-effects on utility could be larger than those captured by our employment analyses.
Another important avenue for further investigation concerns the effect of post-graduation credit constraints on pre-college decisions. If young people anticipate that taking on debt will constrain their consumption choices early in their careers, even free access to student loans will not lead to optimal educational investment. Clearly, optimal design of college financing mechanisms will require a deeper understanding of the role of debt in decision-making and a better characterization of the availability of affordable debt to young people today, both during college and beyond. Notes: N=8,893. Dependent and independent variables are cumulative over four years, and are measured in 2005 dollars. Each specification includes a full set of cohort dummies, a cubic in the cumulative (censored) parental contribution, a set of dummies for the number of years in which the parental contribution was censored, a set of dummies for the number of years that the student applied for aid, and the student's cumulative financial need. Notes: Need/no need categorization is based whether the student ever had positive need during her time at Anon U. Family income is measured in the freshman year, only for students who had positive need in that year. Family contribution is averaged over a student's time at Anon U, censored in each year at the typical cost of attendance in that year and imputed at the censoring point in years that the student did not apply for aid. Standard deviations (for non-binary variables) are shown in square brackets; standard errors are in parentheses. Bold changes and differences-in-differences are significant at the 10% level. Notes: Standard deviations (for non-binary variables) are shown in square brackets; standard errors are in parentheses. Bold changes and differences-in-differences are significant at the 10% level. GPAs and alumni gift data are missing for students in the 2006 cohort.
Simulated loan
Difference
1999-2001 (pre-reform) 2005-6 (fully treated) Change
Any low-money industry Notes: Columns 1 and 4 include a full set of cohort dummies. Columns 2 and 5 add controls for the student's cumulative total need, a 3rd order polynomial in the avg. parental contribution (censored at the budget that applied to the 1999 cohort), and sets of indicators for the number of years the student applied for aid and the number of years the contribution was censored. Columns 3 and 6 add controls for legacy status, firstgeneration college student, recruited athlete, admissions ratings of academic and personal qualifications (as sets of dummy variables), a cubic in family income, and the simulated loan under the rules that applied to the 1999 and 2002 cohorts. In columns 4-6, the instrument is the simulated loan for the actual cohort, assuming that the student enrolled in 4 consecutive years. Bold coefficients are significant at the 10% level.
OLS IV
Any low-money industry Any high-money industry Table 4 . Other specifications change the endogenous variable (column 2), the instrument (column 3), or the sample (column 4). Bold coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
